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On 18 October 1929, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled that women 
were legally eligible for appointment to the Senate of Canada.1 The judgment was 
written by Lord Sankey, the reform-minded Lord Chancellor appointed by Labour 
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. Lord Sankey departed from a long line of cases 
and proclaimed an organic and progressive theory of constitutional interpretation. 
The British North America Act, 18672 had, according to Lord Sankey, planted in 
Canada “a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”3 
This allowed him to rule that “the exclusion of women from all public offices is a 
relic of days more barbarous than ours.”4 
 
 
 The Privy Council’s decision, popularly known in Canada as the “Person’s 
Case”, was a bold legal step that reverberates to this day as a proclamation of 
equality and universal personhood, and as a guiding principle of constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
 
 My lecture, drawn from a book I co-authored,5 is a case study based upon 
archival other contemporary sources that attempts to put the Persons Case in its 
historical context. Who were the people behind the case? What were the legal, social 
and political forces that produced this remarkable decision? I hope that the story I am 
about to tell you will provide some insight into the human and contextual factors that 
shape and influence the legal and interpretive process. 
 
                                            
* Justice Sharpe has been a judge on the Ontario Court of Appeal since 1999. On November 7, 2012 he gave 
the 34th Viscount Bennett Lecture at the University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law. This paper is an 
adapted version of his lecture. 
1 Edwards v Attorney General of Canada, [1930] AC 128 [Edwards]. 
2 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, since 1982, The Constitution Act, 1867. 
3 Edwards, supra note 1 at 135. 
4 Ibid at 128. 
5 Robert Sharpe & Patricia McMahon, The Persons Case: The Origins and Legacy of the Fight for Legal 
Personhood (Toronto: Osgoode Society and University of Toronto Press, 2007). 
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ARE WOMEN PERSONS? 
 
Let me start by explaining the precise legal issue put to the Privy Council in the 
Persons Case. The British North America Act, 1867, a statute enacted by the 
Westminster Parliament that served as Canada’s Constitution until 1982, provides for 
an appointed upper house, the Senate.  The Act states that on the advice of the 
Canadian government, the Governor-General of Canada, as the Queen’s 
representative, can summon “qualified Persons to the Senate," and that “every Person 
so summoned shall become and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator."6 Do the 
words “qualified persons” include women? Today the answer is obviously “yes” but 
it was not so straightforward in 1929. There is no doubt that when the British North 
America Act was written in 1867, the drafters did not  imagine women being 
considered “qualified Persons” capable of being appointed to the Senate. By 1929, 
Canadian women had entered the work force. They could vote and sit in the House 
of Commons but eligibility for the Senate remained cast in the language of 1867. The 
English courts had consistently interpreted similar statutory qualifications for public 
office as excluding women.7 The conventional legal thinking of the day was that the 
words of the constitution had to bear the same meaning in 1929 as they had borne in 
1867, and that it would take a constitutional amendment to make possible a female 
Senator. 
 
 
EMILY MURPHY’S SENATE CAMPAIGN 
 
The Privy Council’s decision in the Persons Case was the result of the untiring 
efforts of Emily Murphy, a well-published author and social crusader,8 and the first 
woman to be appointed as a magistrate in the British Empire when she was named to 
the newly created Women’s Court in Edmonton Alberta in 1916.9 Murphy was not 
legally trained and she did not conduct herself either in or out of court as a traditional 
judge. She saw her role as being that of a social worker and she never surrendered 
her mantle as a social reformer. Courts, she proclaimed, should be “casualty clearing 
stations where ‘magistrate-physicians’ carefully diagnosed the offenders' problems 
and applied the proper remedy."10 Despite her judicial office, Murphy continued to 
speak out on social issues affecting women and children and she continued to 
advocate legal reforms. She attracted national attention with her tirade against the 
evil of drugs in a book entitled The Black Candle, arguing that illicit drug use posed 
                                            
6 Supra note 2 at s 24. 
7 See infra, under the heading “The Department of Justice Opinion and the Persons Cases”. 
8 Byrne Hope Sanders, Emily Murphy: Crusader (Toronto: Macmillan, 1945). 
9 "Woman Magistrate in Edmonton", Edmonton Journal (14 June 1916). 
10 Emily Murphy, "A Straight Talk on Courts", Maclean’s (1 October 1920). 
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a dire threat to the moral health of the nation.11 Clearly, Murphy’s ambitions could 
not be satisfied by the lowly position of a Police Magistrate and, very shortly after 
she was appointed to the bench, she set about to get herself appointed to the 
Canadian Senate. 
 
 
 Murphy’s campaign was widely supported by women’s groups and petitions 
from around the country flowed to the Prime Minister’s office. Her friends found it 
difficult to understand why she was so determined to gain admission to a body 
frequently ridiculed, as one newspaper put it, as a “superfluous fossil institution,"12 
but they supported her out of feminist solidarity. 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OPINION AND THE PERSONS CASES 
 
Murphy quickly found that her quest for a Senate appointment faced a formidable 
hurdle. In response to her lobbying efforts, the Canadian Department of Justice 
developed a detailed legal opinion to the effect that women were not qualified 
persons for appointment to the Senate.13 According to the government’s law officers, 
nothing short of a constitutional amendment was needed if Murphy was to fulfill her 
Senate dream. 
 
 
 That opinion was well supported by authority. In a series of decisions 
knows as “the Persons cases,” the English courts had steadfastly denied that a 
woman could vote, hold public office, or gain admission to the universities or the 
professions. The leading decision, Chorlton v Lings,14 decided in 1868 dealt with the 
Representation of the People Act, 1867, which was debated and enacted the same 
year as the BNA Act. This legislation extended the vote to “every man” of full age 
who was a householder and not “subject to any legal incapacity."15 Relying on the 
Interpretation Act, 1850 that provided that “words importing the Masculine Gender 
shall be taken to include Females… unless the contrary … is expressly provided,”16 
                                            
11 (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1922). Cited in "The Grave Drug Menace", Maclean’s (15 February 1920); "The 
Underground System", Maclean’s (15 March 1920); "Fighting the Drug Menace", Maclean’s (15 April 
1920); "The Doctor – and the Drug", Maclean’s (15 May 1920); "What Must be Done", Maclean’s (15 
June 1920). 
12 Grain Growers’ Guide (1921), Edmonton, City of Edmonton Archives (clipping in Emily Murphy 
Collection, MS2, Scrapbook 4). 
13 Memorandum from WSE (2 March 1921), Ottawa, Archives Canada (Department of Justice File, RG 13, 
vol 2524, vol 2525, File C-1004). 
14 Chorlton v Lings (1868), LR 4 CP 374 [Chorlton]. 
15 30 & 31 Vict c 102, s 3. 
16 13–14 Vict c 21, s 4. 
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5000 female voters from Manchester insisted that they were entitled to vote. Their 
case was argued by John Duke Coleridge, QC, an eminent barrister and prominent 
Liberal member of the House of Commons, later Chief Justice, and Richard 
Pankhurst, a radical lawyer, who later married Emmeline Goulden, the leading figure 
in the suffrage movement. Coleridge and Pankhurst contended that the law extending 
the vote to “every man” had to be read in light of the Interpretation Act stipulation 
that masculine words presumptively included females and that women were every bit 
as entitled as men to vote. The argument was summarily rejected. Chief Justice 
Bovill conceded that the word “men” ordinarily included women by virtue of the 
Interpretation Act but that the provision did not apply where the result was 
“ridiculous.”17 So far as the Chief Justice was concerned, enfranchising women 
clearly fell into the category of ridiculous. 
 
 
 There were many other “Persons cases” that followed the same line of 
reasoning. A 1908 decision of the House of Lords held that a statute that gave a vote 
to “all persons” who had graduated from certain universities did not give the vote to 
female graduates.18 The tone of Lord Chancellor Loreburn’s judgment is revealing: 
 
 
It is incomprehensible to me that any one acquainted with our laws or 
the methods by which they are ascertained can think, if any one does 
think, that there is room for argument on such a point.19 
 
 
Parliament appeared to resolve the matter by enacting the Sex Disqualification 
(Removal) Act, 1919 providing that “[a] person shall not be disqualified by sex or 
marriage from the exercise of any public function.”20 But when Margaret Haig 
Thomas inherited her father’s peerage and sought admission to the House of Lords as 
Viscountess Rhonnda, the door was slammed by Lord Birkenhead’s ruling. The 
words used by Parliament, he stated, were so “vague and general” that “when dealing 
with a constitutional question of the utmost gravity” they could not be interpreted as 
“affecting a revolutionary change in the privileges of this House,” and that 
Parliament “cannot be taken to have employed such loose and ambiguous words to 
carry out so momentous a revolution in the constitution of this House.”21 
 
 
                                            
17 Chorlton, supra note 14 at 386. 
18 Nairn v the University of St. Andrews, [1909] AC 147. 
19 Ibid at 160. 
20 UK 9 & 10 GeoV, c 71, s 1. 
21 Viscountess Rhonnda’s Claim (Committee for Privileges), [1922] AC 339 at 365, 375. 
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 Against this tide of authority stood one bold decision from Alberta that had 
rejected a challenge to the appointment of women as magistrates.22 As Murphy later 
recorded: “[O]n my initial appearance as a Police Magistrate…my jurisdiction was 
sharply challenged by counsel for the defence… It was then argued in almost every 
case upon which I sat that women were eligible to hold office.”23 
 
 
 In a ruling that foreshadowed the Persons Case, a strong and independent-
minded Alberta Judge, Charles Allan Stuart, affirmed the legality of appointing 
female magistrates. Stuart proclaimed, “the Courts of this province are not in every 
case to be held strictly bound by the decisions of the English courts” and insisted that 
he was “at liberty to take cognizance of the different conditions… and the general 
attitude of the community”24 to hold women eligible for public office.  
 
 
 Murphy regarded the challenge to her right to sit on the bench as an affront 
to her personal dignity. It was an insult that reverberated in her mind for years to 
come and, combined with Justice Stuart’s progressive decision, fuelled her 
determination to fight the Persons case to the end. 
 
 
LEGAL OPINIONS 
 
To meet the road block created by the Department of Justice opinion, Murphy sought 
opinions of her own. First, she prevailed upon her brother William Ferguson, an 
Ontario Judge who could not give her a formal opinion but who obliged under the 
guise of a “dear sister” letter clearly intended for wider circulation.25 To bolster 
brother William’s encouraging advice, Murphy retained a distinguished Quebec 
lawyer, Eugene Lafleur, who frequently argued constitutional cases for the federal 
government. Lafleur was known to be sympathetic to women’s causes but he 
disappointed Murphy. He wrote that while the word “persons” was gender neutral 
and certainly could include women, the problem was the attitude of the judges. He 
advised that the Alberta judgment affirming Murphy’s appointment as a magistrate 
simply could not withstand scrutiny in the face of the overwhelming body of English 
cases to the contrary.26 
                                            
22 R v Cyr, [1917] 3 WWR 849 [Cyr]. The case dealt specifically with Alice Jamieson who had been 
appointed as a magistrate in Calgary a few months after Murphy’s appointment. 
23 Letter from Emily Murphy to JF Hynes (20 December 1932) in Emily Ferguson Murphy Papers, 
University of Waterloo, Doris Lewis Rare Book Room (WA 13, File 5). 
24 Cyr, supra note 22 at 857. 
25 Letter from WN Ferguson to Emily Murphy (18 March 1921), Ottawa, Archives Canada (Arthur Meighen 
Papers, Series 2, MG 26, 1, vol 48, File 192). 
26 E Lafleur, "Opinion: Appointment of Women to the Senate of Canada" (9 December 1921), Waterloo 
(Murphy Papers, File 16).  
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LOBBYING MACKENZIE KING 
 
Murphy was undeterred by this legal set-back and decided to turn to politicking. She 
began a shameless lobbying campaign directed at Canada’s Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King. King was first elected in 1921. He would be Canada’s longest-
serving Prime Minister and he was an extraordinarily crafty politician. He played 
along with Murphy, never saying no but realizing all the while that his political 
situation made it virtually impossible to appoint her to the Senate. In 1921, King led 
a minority government and his coalition partner, a radical populist party from the 
West, advocated Senate abolition, not reform. By the time King secured a majority in 
1926, the federal government was deadlocked with the provinces on the issue of an 
amending formula for the British North America Act. Only the Westminster 
Parliament could amend Canada’s 1867 constitution but in the 1920s, Canadian 
politicians could not agree among themselves how and when to ask Westminster for 
an amendment. 
 
 
 Neither Senate reform nor constitutional amendment were in the political 
cards. Another factor, unknown to Murphy, was King’s own sexist assessment of 
her. King, a life-long bachelor who regularly conducted séances to consult his 
deceased mother on important issues of state, also kept a detailed and often revealing 
diary. Here is what he wrote in his diary about Emily Murphy after agreeing to her 
persistent requests for a personal meeting: he found her “very friendly and pleasant 
to talk with” and a “genuine person,” but added that she was “a little too masculine, 
& possibly a little too sensational. I don’t care for aggressive women & she 
possesses a little aggressiveness ….”27 
 
 
GOING TO COURT 
 
As the months and years passed with vague assurances from King that he would do 
what he could, it became apparent to Murphy that she had to turn to the courts.  
There she faced not only the legal opinions that her case was doomed to fail but also 
significant procedural and practical hurdles. Murphy had no standing and no 
recognizable legal claim to advance. As the Department of Justice opinion that 
blocked her was merely advice given by the government, there was no way for her to 
attack it in court. Moreover, she lacked the means to fund a costly legal challenge. 
 
 
 But again, brother William Ferguson, the Ontario judge, came to her rescue. 
He advised Murphy to petition the government to direct a reference on the point to 
                                            
27 Diary of, William Lyon Mackenzie King (26 October 1922), online: Archives Canada 
<http://king.collectionscanada.ca>. 
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the Supreme Court.28 If the government agreed, the standing issue disappeared as did 
the matter of cost, as the government would fund the case. 
 
 
 References are a frequently used and distinctively Canadian device to bring 
contentious constitutional issues before the courts expeditiously.29 The government 
simply states the question of constitutionality and asks the Supreme Court to decide. 
Murphy had no right to demand a reference but fortunately for her, the wily Prime 
Minister King was very fond of the reference power, especially when it allowed him 
to get a contentious issue off his desk. Emily Murphy’s Senate campaign had 
become an annoyance and when she asked for a reference, King happily handed the 
ball over to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
 
THE FAMOUS FIVE 
 
Murphy wanted to distance her request for a reference from her own ambitions and 
to make the case appear to be a request from the women’s movement. She enlisted 
four prominent women from her native Alberta to sign the petition. 
Henrietta Edwards had been a stalwart member of the women’s movement for over 
fifty years. Although she was not a lawyer, she wrote books on the legal rights of 
women and lobbied for their improvement.30 Nellie McClung was well-known across 
Canada as a writer and as a passionate advocate for temperance and women’s 
suffrage.31 Louise McKinney, a leading figure in the temperance movement, was the 
first woman elected to the Alberta legislature in 1917, the year after Alberta women 
got the vote.32 Irene Parlby, a founder of the United Farm Women’s Association, was 
elected to the Alberta legislature in 1921 and was serving as a minister without 
portfolio in the cabinet of the United Farmers Association government when the 
Persons case was argued.33 
 
 
                                            
28 Letter from Emily Murphy to JP Hynes (20 December 1932), Waterloo (Murphy Papers, File 5). 
29 See BL Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The Function and Scope of Judicial Review, 
3d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 73-86; R Sharpe & K Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
3d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 107-10. 
30 Henrietta Edwards, Legal Status of Canadian Women (Calgary: National Council of Women of Canada, 
1908); Legal Status of Canadian of Women in Alberta (Edmonton: Attorney General of Alberta, 1921). 
31 See Nellie McClung, In Times Like These (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). 
32 See Nancy M Sheehan, "Achieving Personhood: Louise McKinney and the WCTU in Alberta, 1905-
1930" in Women as Persons, Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the Canadian Research Institute 
for the Advancement of Women,Edmonton, November 9-11, 1979 (Toronto: Resources for Feminist 
Research, 1980). 
33 Barbara Villy Cormack, Perennials and Politics (Sherwood Park, AB: Professional Print, 1968). 
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 The five women who signed the petition – after their victory in the Persons 
case known to Canadians by the heroic title “The Famous Five” – were determined 
social reformers who had fought for suffrage and for laws to improve the lives of 
women under Canadian law. Yet by 1928, they had lost touch with the aspirations of 
the next generation of women and their views diverged sharply from those of modern 
feminists. They espoused the distinctive role of women as mothers and wives. 
Maternal feminists34 believed that the application of female, maternal virtue to issues 
of social welfare would improve Canadian society and the lot of the disadvantaged, 
especially impoverished women and children. They advocated the legal equality of 
men and women but they did not seek to obliterate traditional gender roles. All five 
women were also strong Christians, adherents of the social gospel movement, and 
believed in societal improvement through the application of Christian morality in 
public life. Temperance and the prohibition of alcohol were central to the maternal 
feminist agenda. Alcohol was blamed for poisoning private, domestic life and was 
thought to have a corrupting influence on politics. Maternal feminists, in short were 
only distantly related to modern feminists. They were overwhelmingly middle-class, 
white, heterosexual, Anglo-Saxon Christians with an elitist sense of their own virtue 
and moral superiority. They viewed women as “naturally the guardians of the 
race,”35 and that race was decidedly white, British, and Protestant. Maternal 
feminists were progressive but they shared the racist and xenophobic attitudes that 
prevailed in the society in which they lived. Worse still to the modern eye, Murphy 
and her group promoted eugenics as a means to improve public health including laws 
that permitted the sterilization of “mental defectives.”36 
 
 
 These views shock the modern reader and quite rightly attract fire from 
today’s feminists, who on the one hand revere the Famous Five for the achievement 
of the Persons Case, yet struggle “to transcend” what they regard as the “insensitivity 
and arrogance” and “debilitating moral blind spots” of their predecessors.37 
 
 
                                            
34 J McLaren, “Maternal Feminism in Action – Emily Murphy, Police Magistrate” (1988) 8 Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice 234; A Acorn, “Snap-shots Then and Now: Feminism and Law in Alberta” 
(1996)  35 Alta LR 140; Linda Kealy, ed, A Not Unreasonable Claim: Women and Reform in Canada 
1880’s–1920’s (Toronto: The Women’s Press, 1979) at 7; Veronica Strong-Boag, introduction to Nellie 
McClung, In Times Like These (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972); Marlene LeGates, In Their 
Time: A History of Feminism in Western Society (London: Routledge, 2001) at 243; Sarah Carter, Lesley 
Erickson, Patricia Roome, and Char Smith, eds, Unsettled Pasts – Reconceiving the West Through 
Women’s History (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005). 
35 McClung,  supra note 31 at 22. 
36 Sterilization Act, SA 1928, c 37. See Timothy Christian, The Mentally Ill and Human Rights in Alberta: A 
Study of the Alberta Sexual Sterilization Act (Edmonton: Alberta Law Foundation, 1974). 
37 Acorn, supra note 33 at 141-42; Mariana Valverde, “When the Mother of the Race is Free: Race, 
Reproduction, and Sexuality in First Wave Feminism” in F Iacovetta and M Valderde, eds, Gender 
Conflicts: New Essays in Women’s History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992)  at ch 1. 
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AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
 
The Supreme Court heard the case in a single day on 14 March 1928, the day Emily 
Murphy turned sixty years old. Less than six weeks later the court rendered its 
decision. The lead judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Frank Anglin, who 
believed in “scientific jurisprudence,” a version of legal formalism that saw the law 
in terms of fixed, immutable rules akin to the laws of science.38 Anglin remained true 
to his jurisprudential views when he sat down to write his judgment in the Persons 
Case. He insisted that he was “in no wise concerned with the desirability or the 
undesirability of the presence of women in the Senate, nor with any political aspect 
of the question submitted”.39 Adhering strictly to what he perceived to be the letter of 
the constitution and the English precedents, Anglin held that the words “qualified 
persons” had to “bear to-day the same construction which the courts would, if then 
required to pass upon them, have given to them when they were first enacted.”40 
Anglin’s starting point, freezing the meaning of the constitution in terms of the 
prevailing norms of 1867, determined the outcome. Anglin was simply not prepared 
to question the thinking of another age about the role of women in public life as that 
would bring about a “striking constitutional departure from the common law.”41 
 
 
 No one can challenge the ideal that our system of law should be as free as 
possible from the personal beliefs, biases, and prejudices of judges. The difficulty is 
that the law does not operate in a vacuum. Legal texts and legal decision-making are 
imbued with moral, philosophical, and social values. To pretend that the law is a 
purely objective, morally neutral phenomenon ignores important questions of value 
that drive and determine decisions. Judges cannot decide cases entirely on the basis 
of neutral, objective principles, and the pretence that they do conceals a significant 
component of judicial reasoning. 
 
 
 The law’s treatment of women provides a classic example.42 The common 
law denied women property rights and the rights to vote and to hold public office. 
The denial of equal treatment to women was the product of social and political 
forces. It was a matter of moral and political choice. There is nothing inherent or 
                                            
38 Frank Anglin, “Some Differences Between the Law of Quebec and the Law as Administered in the other 
Provinces of Canada” (1923) 1:33 Can Bar Rev  43; Ian Bushnell, The Captive Court: A Study of the 
Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992) at 56.  
39 Reference Re the Meaning of the Word ‘Persons’ in Section 24 of the British North America Act, [1928] 
SCR 276 at 281. 
40 Ibid at 282. 
41 Ibid at 285. 
42 See Mary Jane Mossman, “Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes” (1986) 3:30 Aust J of 
Law and Soc  where she discusses this point in relation to the Persons case. 
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morally neutral about the subjection of women to inferior status, yet the formalist 
tradition of law, to which Chief Justice Anglin and his colleagues were so firmly 
wedded, precluded scrutiny of those values and choices long after they had ceased to 
reflect contemporary reality. 
 
 
 There is, to be sure, a legitimate debate on the extent to which judges should 
shape or change the law to meet changing social problems, but to pretend that judges 
never change or “make” the law is untenable. The common law is constantly shaped 
and moulded by the courts to suit the changing needs of society. Even when courts 
interpret and apply statutes enacted by Parliament, judges cannot avoid taking into 
account the needs of contemporary society. As we have seen, by refusing to apply 
the gender neutral principle proclaimed by the Interpretation Act and other 
legislation, judges had thwarted the will of Parliament. 
 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision was denounced in the media as absurd,43 yet 
the judgment caused nary a ripple in Canada’s conservative legal community, which 
seemed to have regarded the result as inevitable. 
 
 
ON TO THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE THE PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
Emily Murphy regarded the Supreme Court’s decision as a temporary set-back and 
she prepared for her next battle in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
which was, until 1949, Canada’s court of last resort. This august imperial institution, 
one of the last vestiges of Canada’s colonial past, served as the final judicial arbiter 
for legal disputes throughout the Empire and played a pivotal role in Canada’s 
constitutional evolution for more than eighty years. Scholars still debate the merits of 
the Judicial Committee’s influence on Canada’s constitutional arrangements.44 In the 
seemingly unending string of jurisdictional disputes between Canada’s Parliament 
and the provinces, the Judicial Committee favoured provincial autonomy at the 
expense of federal authority. Many Canadian lawyers, legal scholars and politicians 
found this pattern in the Privy Council’s jurisprudence disturbing,45 but as it was 
                                            
43 “It looks as though Bumble [“the law is a Ass”] was right”, Ottawa Evening Journal (25 April 1928) 
quoted in David Ricardo Williams, Duff: A Life in the Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1984) at 146; “Women Liberals Become Indignant at Ottawa Ruling”, Toronto Globe (25 April 
1928); “Federal Women to Ask Change in Act Wording”, Toronto Daily Star (24 April 1928); Agnes 
MacPhail, “Seek Way to Admit Women to Senate”, Toronto Daily Star (25 April 1928). 
44 See John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian 
Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). 
45 Richard Risk, “The Scholars and the Constitution: P.O.G.G. and the Privy Council” (1996) 23 Man LJ 
496, reprinted in Richard Risk, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: Collected Essays (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 233; HA Smith, “Residue of Power in Canada” (1926) 4 Can Bar 
Rev 432 was among the first outspoken critics in the 1920s to complain about the JCPC and its 
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based on a rejection of the “intention” theory of interpretation, it significantly 
improved Murphy’s chances. The fathers of Confederation envisaged a powerful 
central government and a highly centralized federation where the provinces were 
viewed as little more than glorified municipalities. Led by Sankey’s friend and 
predecessor as Lord Chancellor, Viscount Richard Haldane, a Hegelian philosopher 
and leading proponent of provincial rights,46 the Privy Council refused to abide by 
the apparent intention of the framers of Canada’s 1867 constitution. 
 
 
 Canadian constitutional lawyers were so alarmed by Haldane’s approach 
that there were calls for abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.47 But the Privy 
Council’s refusal to be bound by the framers' intentions augured well for Emily 
Murphy if – and it was a very big if – that judicial philosophy had sufficient force to 
overtake the sexist attitudes revealed in the earlier Persons case decisions. 
 
 
JOHN SANKEY: LORD CHANCELLOR 
 
On that front, Emily Murphy’s timing was perfect. In the summer of 1929, Britain 
elected a Labour government and Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald appointed 
John Sankey as Lord Chancellor. Emily Murphy’s case would be one of the first 
Sankey heard while presiding over the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
 
 
 John Sankey was a man of humble origins. He did, however, have an 
Oxford education. He was called to the bar in 1892. He had a varied practice on the 
South Wales circuit, with a concentration on workers’ compensation cases. Sankey’s 
initial political instincts were conservative and he was elected to the London County 
Council under the Conservative banner in 1910. However, politics did not figure in 
his appointment to the High Court Bench in 1914 by Richard Haldane, Lord 
Chancellor in Asquith’s Liberal government. Sankey earned a reputation as a solid 
judge who performed his duties “without fuss or notoriety.”48 
 
 
                                                                                                       
construction of the BNA Act. Others followed suit, but primarily in the 1930s. See Risk, A History of 
Canadian Legal Thought at 241. 
46 Frederick Vaughan, Viscount Haldane: Wicked Stepfather of the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: 
Osgoode Society and University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
47 Among those making these pleas were Chief Justice Anglin: James G Snell and Frederick Vaughan, The 
Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 183. 
Newton Rowell, Murphy’s counsel on the Persons Case also sought to have the Privy Council removed as 
Canada’s court of last resort: Letter from Rowell to King, (11 March 1926) in M Prang, N.W. Rowell: 
Ontario Nationalist (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) at 441. 
48 RFV Heuston, Lives of the Lord Chancellors, 1885–1940 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) at 525. 
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 In 1919, Prime Minister Lloyd George appointed Sankey as the chairman of 
a commission to investigate the coal-mining industry. The industry, plagued by low 
production, squalid working conditions, and bitter relations between the owners and 
the miners, was in crisis because of the social and political upheaval of the war, the 
rise of the Labour movement, and the demands of workers for a greater share of the 
nation’s wealth. This appointment transformed Sankey’s political outlook and 
changed the direction of his career. Two of his fellow commissioners were Sidney 
Webb, a social reformer and the founder of the Fabian Society, and R.H. Tawney, a 
prominent economic historian and an activist in the Workers’ Educational 
Association. The hearings were difficult and acrimonious. Sankey recorded in his 
diary that presiding over the hearings was “like sitting on a barrel of gunpowder,”49 
to which he added: “It would be possible to say without exaggeration of the miners’ 
leaders that they were the stupidest men in England if we had not frequent occasion 
to meet the owners.”50 
 
 
 Sankey’s work on the commission had a profound and lasting effect upon 
his outlook. His “sense of justice was outraged by the descriptions of the living 
conditions of the miners; and his sense of decency was shocked by the cynical and 
selfish attitude of the owners”.51 To the shock of his conservative judicial colleagues, 
Sankey recommended nationalization of the coal mine industry. The government did 
not act but Sankey was a changed man, drifting steadily away from his innate 
conservatism towards an increasingly pro-Labour outlook. His social and intellectual 
circle now included many who were sympathetic to the cause of Labour. Fabian 
socialists Sydney and Beatrice Webb often included Sankey in their dinner parties 
with another famous Fabian, George Bernard Shaw, and the left-leaning political 
scientist Harold Laski. In a letter to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
Laski described Sankey as “our best judge, with insight, scholarship and exquisite 
taste. His one defect is keen churchmanship.”52 
 
 
 Sankey was elevated to the Court of Appeal in 1928 and within a year he 
was appointed Lord Chancellor. In his speech at the annual Lord Mayor’s Judge’s 
Dinner at Mansion House in early July 1929, he announced an ambitious agenda of 
reform.53 It was clear that Sankey was determined to leave his mark. 
 
 
                                            
49 Diary (6 May 1919), Oxford, Bodleian Library (John Sankey Papers, MSS Eng hist, e273). 
50 Heuston, supra note 48 at 505. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Mark De Wolfe Howe, ed, Holmes – Laski Letters (New York: Atheneum,1963) at 383, quoted in 
Heuston, supra note 48 at 506. 
53 "The Law and the Public", Times (London) (6 July 1929). 
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AT THE PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
The Persons Case was argued within a month of Sankey’s appointment before a 
panel of five judges. The Privy Council was a very busy court and to meet the need, 
membership was expanded to include a long list of retired and colonial judges. The 
panel of five selected for the Persons Case was certainly not drawn from the Privy 
Council’s “first team”. Only one member of the panel, Thomas Tomlin, was a Lord 
of Appeal in ordinary. The only other sitting judge was Lord Merrivale, President of 
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty division of the high court. 
 
 
 The final two members of the panel were retired judges. Charles John 
Darling was a popular figure in the legal community with a mixed reputation as a 
judge. He was a poet and a journalist, not a prominent member of the bar. His Times 
obituary notice later described his practice as “microscopic.”54 Rumours of his 
possible appointment to the bench in 1897 had provoked an uproar. A leader in the 
Times described him as a man of “acute intellect and considerable literary power,” 
but asserted that he had “given no sign of legal eminence”, and argued that his 
appointment was based solely on his political affiliation.55 The Liberal Daily 
Chronicle was more scathing: “Mr. Darling… is an extreme partisan of the 
Government now in office…He has no serious knowledge of the law and has never 
handled any important practice at the Bar. The whole transaction is grossly 
scandalous.”56 Yet over the next twenty-six years, Darling presided over a number of 
difficult and sensational murder cases with considerable skill. His best-known trials 
are legendary57 and include the trial of the notorious “Chicago May” for attempted 
murder in 1907, the 1911 trial of Stennie Morrison for murder, and the sensational 
1922 trial of Herbert Armstrong, a Welsh solicitor, for poisoning his wife. Darling 
was not a profound legal thinker nor was he a great judge but he displayed common 
sense, sound judgment, and a good understanding of human nature. These were the 
qualities of a reliable trial judge but hardly what was required for service on the apex 
court for the British Empire. 
 
 
 The fifth judge was Sir Lancelot Sanderson, not a well-known legal figure. 
He was a keen sportsman who had studied at Harrow and Cambridge before 
practicing as a barrister on the Northern Circuit. Elected to the House of Commons 
in 1910 as a Unionist MP, Sanderson was appointed Chief Justice of Bengal in 1915, 
a post he filled for eleven years. As his Times obituary would later report, “his tenure 
                                            
54 Obituary, Times (London) (30 May 1936). 
55 Times (London) (26 October 1897), quoted in LG Wickham Legg, ed, Dictionary of National Biography 
(1931–1940) (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1949) at 211. 
56 Derek Walker-Smith, The Life of Lord Darling (London: Cassell and Company, 1938) at 93-94. 
57 See Dudley Barker, Lord Darling’s Famous Cases (London: Hutchinson, 1936). 
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of office [as Chief Justice of Bengal] left no permanent landmark in Indian legal 
history.”58 Sanderson returned to England following his retirement from the Indian 
Bench in 1926, and often sat in the Privy Council on appeal from India and 
occasionally from  the Dominions. 
 
 
THE LIVING TREE 
 
We do not know what part, if any, the other four members of the panel took in the 
preparation of the Privy Council’s reasons, but it is clear from his diary that Sankey 
undertook to do the work,59 and it would seem that the final product was his alone. 
Two themes pervade the judgment.  
 
 
 The first is the recognition that legal rules or customs are the products of a 
particular social and historical context. Laws may outlive the customs and traditions 
that gave rise to them, and courts should take this into account when interpreting the 
law in a different context. Sankey carefully reviewed the legal authorities excluding 
women from public office. He acknowledged the centuries of legal discrimination 
against women, but refused to view the law in static terms or to be bound by the past. 
The word “persons” was “ambiguous, and in its original meaning would undoubtedly 
embrace members of either sex.” If the original meaning of the word could include 
women, it was social tradition and custom, not the law, that excluded women. 
Sankey concluded: “The appeal to history therefore in this particular matter is not 
conclusive.”60 In Sankey’s view, it was wrong “to apply rigidly to Canada of today 
the decisions and the reasons therefore which commended themselves, probably 
rightly, to those who had to apply the law in different circumstances, in different 
centuries, to countries in different stages of development.”61 As the word “persons” 
could include both genders, Sankey wrote, “to those who ask why the word should 
include females, the obvious answer is why should it not?”62 
 
 
 Sankey’s second theme was the difference between statutory interpretation 
and constitutional interpretation. He characterized the evolution of the British North 
America Act, 1867 as an affirmation of Canadian unity and self-determination. 
Again, Sankey emphasized the importance of social tradition and custom in legal 
development. As the final court of appeal for “the Britannic system,” which includes 
                                            
58 Times (London) (11 March 1944). 
59 Diary, (18 October 1929), Oxford, Bodleian Library (John Sankey Papers, e 283). 
60 Edwards, supra note 1, at 134. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid at 138. 
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“countries and peoples in every stage of social, political and economic development 
and undergoing a continuous process of evolution,” the Privy Council “must take 
great care not to interpret legislation meant to apply to one community by a rigid 
adherence to the customs and traditions of another.”63 Ironically, the voice of 
supreme colonial power was insisting upon the very independence and legal maturity 
that Canada’s own judges had refused to claim for themselves. 
 
 
 It is within this context that Lord Sankey presented what has come to be the 
most memorable phrase in modern Canadian constitutional law: “The British North 
America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within 
its natural limits.”64 The living tree metaphor described the constitution in the 
organic terms of growth and evolution. It was, wrote, Sankey, neither the duty nor 
the desire of the Privy Council “to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow 
and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation” to 
allow the Dominion to be “mistress in her own house.”65 
 
 
 The Canadian press applauded the decision.66 The London dailies fastened 
on the phrase “a relic of an age more barbarous than ours” and warmly applauded the 
judgement. The Evening Standard proclaimed that the judgment “will have an 
indirect bearing on the political activities of women throughout the Empire.”67 The 
Daily Telegraph, which had given the case extensive coverage, called the decision “a 
significant advance towards the equality of political rights for both sexes.”68 
 
 
 However, the idea that the constitution was a timeless document capable of 
adapting over time to meet the changing needs of Canadian society did not have 
immediate resonance in the staid Canadian legal community. An article in the 
Canadian Bar Review defended the Supreme Court of Canada for having applied the 
settled rules of statutory interpretation that Lord Sankey and his colleagues had 
“simply… brushed aside,” ignoring points that were “obvious… to a legal mind.”69 
The author, a senior practitioner, undoubtedly anxious to please Chief Justice 
Anglin, made the extraordinary accusation that the Privy Council had acted as the 
                                            
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid at 136. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Toronto Daily Star (18 October 1929); Edmonton Journal (19 October 1929); “Woman, As Person, May 
Sit in Senate Says Privy Council”, Globe (19 October 1929). 
67 “A Woman’s Big Victory in Privy Council”, Evening Standard (London) (18 October 1929). 
68 Editorial, Daily Telegraph (19 October 1929). 
69 George Henderson, “Eligibility of Women for the Senate” (1929) , 7 Can Bar Rev 617 at 619. 
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willing tool of Mackenzie King, who he claimed had secretly invited the Privy 
Council to amend the constitution by judicial fiat.70 
 
 
A SENATE SEAT FOR EMILY MURPHY? 
 
For Emily Murphy and the Canadian feminist movement, the victory was gratifying 
but short-lived. A woman was appointed to the Senate by Mackenzie King in 1930, 
but that woman was not Emily Murphy.71 Murphy retired from the bench on 11 
November 1931, but she never gave up her desire for a seat in the Senate. In April 
1931, the death of Senator Lessard of Alberta created just such an opportunity. 
However, Mackenzie King’s Liberals had been defeated in the 1930 general election 
and Conservative leader R.B. Bennett was now Canada’s prime minister. Murphy 
knew Bennett from his days as a member of the Alberta legislature when he had been 
her ally in the promotion of improved property rights for women. Having spent the 
past decade currying favour with King and the Liberals, Murphy set out to renew her 
ties with the Conservative Party. As with previous Senate vacancies, Murphy’s 
supporters wrote to urge Murphy’s appointment.72 
 
 
 Bennett was willing to disregard political affiliation but he could not ignore 
religion. He decided that tradition dictated that “as the sole representative of the 
Catholic minority in our province,”73 Lessard should be replaced by a Catholic. 
Bennett appointed Pat Burns, a well-known Liberal and wealthy rancher. Murphy 
was not given serious consideration.74 
 
 
THE LEGACY OF THE PERSONS CASE 
 
The recognition of women as legal persons was a momentous legal achievement, but 
full personhood required more than an edict from the Privy Council at a time when 
that institution’s authority was being questioned and in an era not yet ready to 
embrace women as true equals. The philosophy of Murphy and the other member of 
the Famous Five based on maternal feminism, social gospel and temperance was a 
spent force. Murphy and her colleagues had lost touch with the concerns of younger 
women and their fight to secure the appointment of women to the Senate simply 
                                            
70 Ibid at 628. 
71 Carine Wilson was appointed to the Senate by Prime Minister King on 15 February 1930. 
72 Letter from Edwards/Gardiner Family Fonds [nd] Calgary, Glenbow Archives (M7 283, File 15). 
73 Sanders, supra note 8 at 258; “Five Are Mentioned by Rumors in City for Seat in Senate”, The Albertan (4 
May 1931). 
74 “Five Are Mentioned by Rumors in City for Seat in Senate”, supra note 73, does not mention Murphy as a 
possible contender and suggests that women’s groups were promoting the appointment of Mrs PJ Nolan. 
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failed in their attempts to rekindle the passions of the suffrage movement. The 
advancement of rights for women would take real social change that would not come 
until the 1970s. 
 
 
 Canadian lawyers and judges also essentially ignored the majestic language 
of Lord Sankey’s living tree metaphor for over fifty years.75 It was not until the era 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adopted in 1982, that the Persons Case came 
into its own. The Supreme Court of Canada of the 1980s, a very different institution 
than the Supreme Court of the 1920s, fully embraced the living tree metaphor as a 
guiding principle of constitutional interpretation.76 
 
 
 The Persons Case, the ideal of universal personhood and the living tree 
approach to constitutional interpretation are now recognized as cornerstones of the 
Canadian constitution. Persons Day celebrations are held every October 18 and the 
Governor General makes Persons Day awards to recognize contributions to the 
equality of women in Canada. A statue of the Famous Five sits on Parliament Hill 
amid various leading lights of Canadian political history and, until very recently, our 
$50 bills bore an inscription of that statue on the reverse. 
 
 
 I hope that my story has persuaded you of the advantages to taking a close 
look at the people and the politics behind a specific case. One sees that individuals 
do make a difference and that a landmark ruling can be driven by unpredictable 
personal and political combinations. In retrospect, we can agree that the Privy 
Council got it right, yet at the time, there was nothing inevitable about the result. But 
for the unlikely coincidence of Emily Murphy’s unquenchable thirst for a Senate 
appointment, Mackenzie King’s fondness for referring difficult questions to the 
courts, and John Sankey’s determination to make his mark as a reforming Lord 
Chancellor, the result could easily have been quite different. 
 
 
 This case study also demonstrates that the law is necessarily constantly 
changing and that it does not and cannot operate in a vacuum isolated from political 
and social forces. In 1928, the Supreme Court, stuck in the mores of another age, had 
failed to move with the times. Women worked, voted and held public office, yet 
Canada’s highest court refused to recognize them as persons. A year later, the Privy 
                                            
75 Justice Ivan Rand referred approvingly to the living tree approach in Winner v SMT (Eastern) Ltd, [1951] 
SCR 922. 
76 Quebec (Attorney General) v Blaikie, [1979] 2 SCR 1029; British Columbia (AG) v Ellett Estate, [1980] 2 
SCR 466 at 478; Reference re: Residential Tenancies Act 1979(Ontario), [1981] 1 SCR 714 at 723 per 
Dickson J: Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 155-56; Law Society of Upper Canada v 
Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357 at 365 per Estey J. 
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Council’s decision broke the centuries-old mould of exclusion because John Sankey 
saw that a way had to be found to permit the law to accommodate the change that 
social forces demanded. 
 
 
 The Persons Case further reveals how the symbolic importance of a 
constitutional decision can transcend the specific issue it decides. Even her closest 
friends could not understand why Emily Murphy was fighting so hard to secure an 
appointment to a body that most Canadians regarded as outdated and irrelevant. Yet 
her fight produced a strong assertion of the principle of equality. 
 
 Finally, the Persons Case teaches us that equality is a constantly evolving 
ideal. Emily Murphy herself held racist and discriminatory beliefs towards those 
suffering from mental illness and disability. Modern feminists distance themselves 
from the views Murphy expressed. But Emily Murphy had the conviction, courage 
and determination to be recognized as a person and, almost a century later, we 
embrace the ideals proclaimed in the Persons Case as lying at the core of our idea of 
a just and democratic society.  
